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In spite of more than a decade of economic restructuring and the introduction of 
extensive market reforms in Russia, there still exists widespread political control over most 
forms of economic activity. In Russia, this type of politicization has resulted in an environment 
in which rules and regulations govern almost all aspects of enterprise activity.  Firms are forced 
to set aside scarce resources dedicated to simultaneously fulfilling a minimum number of 
obligations while persistently trying to evade others.  Furthermore, the elaborate system of 
regulations with which firms must comply has created opportunities for a corrupt cadre of 
government officials to engage in rent-seeking behavior while monitoring and enforcing firm 
compliance.  This behavior exacerbates the regulatory burden for enterprises and creates an 
environment in which bribes and side-payments are the norms to do business.  
This paper addresses the issue of rent-seeking regulatory behavior, which has become 
endemic and entrenched throughout the Russian economy.   Descriptive statistics from a survey 
of Russian microentrepreneurs reveals the breadth and depth to which firms are subject to 
regulatory harassment in the form of frequent inspections and the necessity of making “irregular 
payments” to avoid artificial penalties imposed by regulators.   Furthermore, empirical evidence 
suggests that firms vary significantly in both the quantity of inspections that they undergo, as 
well as across individual perceptions of regulatory difficulties and harassment.   
A theoretical model helps explain this observed phenomenon.  The explanation is that 
firms may vary in the quantities and prices paid for bribes because regulatory officials act price-
discriminating monopolists.  In doing so, corrupt regulators charge each firm a unique bribe price 
and quantity based on a regulator’s perception of an entrepreneur’s willingness-to-pay, as well as 
on the costs of extracting the bribe payment for the regulator.   A game theoretical application 
helps explain the empirical evidence in a manner consistent with the observed stylized facts. By 
employing a unique data set on Russian microenterprises, and a theoretical model that captures 
an observed, stylized phenomenon, we show that (i) corruption is indeed endemic to the 
microenterprise sector, (ii) that firms vary in the degree to which they are vulnerable to rent-  2 
extracting officials, and (iii) we employ a conceptual model to explain how and why these 
differential transactions occur.   
The paper is organized in the following manner: in Section One a very brief overview of 
the descriptive statistics from the survey is provided.  In Section Two the theoretical model is 
explained, and optimal bribe prices and quantities across firms are derived.  In Section Three 
simulations illustrate changes and differences of bribe offers across firms, as well as the welfare 
effects of regulatory-induced corruption.  In Section Four a summary and policy prescriptions are 
provided.  
Section One:  Descriptive Statistics 
The legal and regulatory environment for enterprises in Russia is both oppressive and 
ineffective.  Rules, regulations, and statutes abound which govern all levels and types of 
economic activity.  Furthermore, regional and local political autonomy have led to uneven 
enforcement of the rules, and the local authorities enjoy a high degree of regulatory discretion. 
Equally problematic as the regulations per se, however, is the potential niche they create for 
opportunistic behavior on the part of corrupt regulatory officials, which most often occurs during 
these regulatory inspections.  In order to examine the effect of this institutional backdrop on 
microenterprises in Russia, data was collected from approximately 200 micro and small firms 
located in and around Samara City, a large and economically diverse Russian city, in the summer 
of 1999.  
The survey responses yielded numerous insights that shed light on the manner in which 
firms are affected by the regulatory environment in Russia.  In order to briefly illustrate 
regulatory impact, some tables are presented that highlight trends and averages from the survey 
results.   
The majority of enterprises in the survey are recent start-ups and engage in a wide range of 
services, ranging from retail distributors to small manufacturing firms. The sample was 
comprised of only those firms that employed less than 30 workers. Most enterprises (70 percent) 
employ less than five workers, besides the owner, however.  Thus, the information collected 
provides valuable insight into the lowest economic strata of firms, a constituency that is often 
ignored in both statistical and policy analysis in Russia.  
On average, microenterprises in the survey are inspected 55 times per year, by a variety of 
inspectorates who have legal right to inspect unannounced, at any time, and to impose fines for   3 
cognizant or unwillful lack of compliance. These inspections provide excellent opportunities to 
extract bribes, on one hand, while simultaneously gathering information about the enterprise or 
entrepreneur, on the other hand.  Table 1 illustrates the frequency of supervisory monitoring 
through visits to the enterprise, and the variation across firms of regulatory visits.  Important to 
note is the high proportion of firms subject to regulatory and supervisory inspections, the 
frequency with which the authorities visit them, and the wide range of visits indicating variance 
across firms.  
 
















Tax 68  10.9  8.2  28  0  200 
Fire 61  7.5  1.6  22  0  365 
Sanitation 49  16.0  1.9  55  0  365 
Trade 30  10.7  2.3  31  0  365 
Militia 38 81.5 0.8  102  0  365 
*Source:  Legal and Regulatory Survey of Microenterprises, 1999 
While it is widely accepted that the Russian business and political environment is rife 
with corruption, it is difficult to assess the degree to which this type of behavior exists at the 
local level and the extent to which it affects the types of firms found in our sample.  Among the 
goals of the survey were to investigate the pervasiveness of bribery and corruption for micro and 
small enterprises, to identify government services that necessitate bribe payments, and to 
discover if firm-specific features exist within the sample that appear more inviting to rent-
seeking officials.    
Responses indicate that corruption of civil servants is either problematic or highly 
problematic for one-third of enterprises in the survey, as indicated by Table 2 below.   
Furthermore, the table shows that the majority of entrepreneurs perceive that government 
officials enjoy discretionary power, while 40 percent of firm owners have actually experienced 
its (arbitrary) usage during a firm inspection. 
   4 
Table 2:  Entrepreneurs’ Perceptions of Corruption and Enforcement 
Corruption and Arbitrary Enforcement  Percent of 
Respondents 
Corruption Problematic or Highly Problematic to Enterprise  36 
Regulators Have Discretion in Interpreting Regulations  65 
Regulators Have Changed Regulatory Requirements Without Prior 
Warning 
40 
Source:  Legal and Regulatory Survey of Microenterprises, 1999. 
 
 Table  3 below suggests actions that may necessitate bribes, and the frequency with 
which these types of transactions take place.  Notable is the wide array of government services 
that are perceived to require additional side-payments to government officials, underscoring the 
ubiquity of this practice in the Russian setting.  
 
Table 3:  Government Services that Require Bribes 
Government Services Perceived to Necessitate Bribes  Percent of 
Microenterprises 
 
Issue Permits or Licenses  65 
(18) 
Secure Premises  67 
(19) 
Access Loans  59 
(25) 
Facilitate or Lower Tax Obligations  42 
(26) 
Protect Business  66 
(21) 
*Numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of respondents who declined to answer the question.  Source:  
Legal and Regulatory Survey of Microenterprises, 1999. 
 
In addition to examining the pervasiveness of corrupt activities, it was also of interest to 
uncover certain firm-specific characteristics that are more likely to elicit rent-seeking behavior   5 
by regulators.  Table 4 below highlights firm-level characteristics that appear to attract attention 
from corrupt officials.  



















Firm Size  No. of employees  8.46  9.87  Larger firms 
Age  Year Started  1994  1994  No difference 
Operating Hours  Hours/Day  9.19  10.75  Open longer hrs** 
Operating Days  Days/Week  5.59  5.94  Open more days per 
week** 
Seasonality  Percentage Change in 
Seasonal  Revenue 
121  159  More seasonal variations 
Annual Growth  Employees Added   0.45  1.01  Higher growth firms** 
Tax-Change Percentage  responded 
“yes” to arbitrary tax 
question 
61  78  More vulnerable to 
arbitrary tax collection** 
Monitoring  Visits by All 
Regulatory 
Authorities/Yr 
50.4  54.2  Monitored more frequently 
Female-Owned  Percent Owned by 
Females 
37  26  Female Owner less 
likely** 
Working Capital  Ranking of Finance as 
Constraint (1…4) 
2.06  2.38  More constrained by 
finance** 
Legal Form  Percent Registered as 
Private Individual 
38 37  No  difference 
Sector Percent  of 
Manufacturing Firms 
21  29  More dominated by the 
manufacturing sector** 
**Indicates mean differences are significant at the α =.10 level.   
Source:  Legal and Regulatory Survey of Microenterprises, 1999. 
 
It is not surprising that the higher growth firms invite more extortionist behavior since 
officials can earn a higher rent by targeting the most profitable businesses.  Other notable trends 
emerge from Table 4 as well.  Firms that are open longer hours and more days per week tend to   6 
be more vulnerable to regulatory harassment. This could be attributed to a reduction in costs 
incurred by the regulator in visiting the firm, making it easier to visit with greater frequency.  It 
is also not surprising that firms monitored more frequently find rent-seeking to be more 
problematic than those that are monitored less, given that official visits to firms provide ideal 
opportunities to extract additional rents from entrepreneurs.   It is also of interest to note that 
firms that are targeted for bribes report, on average, that they are more financially constrained 
than enterprises that are not targeted.  This finding (along with other supportive data not 
presented here) may indicate that there are spillover effects of corrupt activities into other related 
markets.   
In summary, descriptive statistics from this survey suggest that even the lowest echelon 
of entrepreneurs, those that would generally operate outside or on the boundaries of the formal 
sector in other countries, are penetrated and subjected to the same levels of bureaucracy, 
inspections, and penalization as one would expect for much larger firms in such an environment. 
The data reveal that high degrees of regulation and their corollary, rent-seeking practices, have 
emerged as a major impediment to business growth.   Furthermore, firms differ substantially in 
the degree to which they are subject to regulatory intrusions and demands for bribes.  The 
theoretical reasons why this is the case are now explored.   
 
Section Two:  The Model 
The variation across firms with respect to being targeted for bribes stems from regulators’ 
ability to use their monopoly position to both influence and to extract information on an 
individual firm’s ability and willingness to pay for a bribe.  In this sense, regulators act as first-
degree price discriminators and extract all surplus associated with individual bribe payments.   
The concept of modeling the government (or agents of the government) as a monopolist 
is not new.  In fact, Klitgaard (1990) defines corruption to be a combination of monopoly power 
and discretion in regulatory enforcement.  Lal (1989) models the state as a predatory monopolist 
who charges for the provision of ‘protection’ and ‘justice’ at high enough prices to maximize 
profit while maintaining barriers to entry.  More recently, Schleiffer and Vishny (1993) model 
the market structure of the supply of government goods as a determinant of the level and 
consequences of corruption.    7 
This particular model is an analysis of a regulator who acts as a pure, single-product 
monopolist facing a large number of price-taking “buyers.” Since one can easily argue, from 
both the literature and the most casual of in-country observations, that the rules and regulations 
with which firms must comply in Russia are superfluous, unenforceable, and are possibly 
designed to preclude compliance, it logically follows that regulators are completely predatory in 
nature.  
The following model captures the price and quantity decision mechanism used by the 
regulator in order to determine the price of a bribe, as well as the number of bribes an 
entrepreneur will be charged or offered.  The purpose of the highly stylized model is to show that 
both the price of a bribe and the number of bribes that a firm must pay is the Bayesian 
equilibrium outcome of a two-period game with incomplete information.   
The game is a leader-cum-follower game, played between a regulator and a firm, and 
takes place under the auspices of regulatory inspections to monitor firm compliance.  A regulator 
is assigned to monitor firm compliance with a specific regulation, and does so through an on-site 
inspection of the firm.  The regulator uses this opportunity to extract a bribe from the firm, 
regardless of whether the firm is in compliance with the regulation or not.  This is a reasonable 
assumption, given that the regulator has complete discretion in deciding whether or not a firm is 
in compliance, and there is no oversight mechanism in place that can corroborate whether or not 
the regulator is being honest in his/her assessment.  We also assume that entrepreneurs do not 
have the incentive to shirk in the face of bribes, so long as post-bribe profits increase 
monotonically.   
The problem of the regulator, in the first period, is to set a bribe price to charge the 
entrepreneur.  Since the regulator does not have full information regarding the entrepreneur’s 
willingness-to-pay a bribe, the bribe is set based on the observed production technology of the 
firm, and the regulator’s knowledge of factor prices.  The regulator seeks to extract the 
maximum that the entrepreneur is willing to pay, without overcharging her.  If he sets the price 
too high, the entrepreneur refuses to pay, and the regulator would receive nothing.  
The set-up of this decision problem is grounded in the fact that there is neither bargaining 
in the model, nor borrowing or lending, so that the firm’s budget constraint is binding.  In order 
to motivate the entrepreneur to pay the bribe, if she is able, the regulator will impose a penalty   8 
that would result in the loss of that period’s firm profits in the case of non-payment.    It is 
assumed that the imposition of this penalty is costless to the regulator.  
In the second period the regulator decides whether or not to re-visit the firm with the 
intention of extracting another bribe.  This decision is based on whether the costs of the second 
visit are less than the expected value of the second-period bribe that he would receive. If the 
regulator decides to visit in period two, he then sets the bribe price for the second period based 
on what he was able to collect in the first period, and this period’s production technology.   A 
more technical description of the game follows.   
The minimum profit that the entrepreneur needs to survive, i.e. her reservation profit, is 
denoted as π R. The entrepreneur’s true profit, denoted as π , is uniformly distributed on [π L, π H], 
but the true value of π  is private information, and is known only to the entrepreneur.  To simplify 
the analysis, assume that π R=π L=0.  π H is part of the belief system of the regulator, and is set 
based on the production technology, production function, and number and types of inputs that are 
observed by the regulator.  In fact, in each period, π H is based only on observable firm 
characteristics, such as capital, labor, technology, and input and output prices.  Thus,  
π H=f(K,L,T,Pi,Po) ,   a n d           ( 1 )  
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The game lasts exactly two periods.  In the first period, the regulator makes a bribe offer 
of b1.  If the firm/entrepreneur accepts the offer, than the payoffs to the regulator and the 
entrepreneur are b1 and π 1 – b1 respectively.  If the entrepreneur declines to pay the bribe in the 
first period, a penalty is imposed of –π 1.  In this case, the payoffs to both the regulator and 
entrepreneur are 0.  Note that the regulator need not know the true profit in the first period to 
impose this penalty.  He could shut down the firm, for example, or harass customers or 
management. Recall that imposing the penalty is a costless action for the regulator.   
The game then proceeds to the second period.  In the second period, the regulator has the 
choice of either visiting the firm again in order to extract a second bribe, or he can choose not to 
visit.  Now, however, he must consider the cost of the visit, as well as the potential payoffs from 
the bribe, when making this decision. (Note that in the first visit, he did not account for the cost 
since it was assigned as part of his job.)   The cost of the visit is known to both players, is   9 
exogenous, and is unique to each firm, i.  If the regulator chooses not to revisit the firm, the 
game ends and the second period payoffs for the regulator and entrepreneur are [0, π 2] 
respectively.    If he does choose to re-visit the firm, he again sets a bribe price based on the 
production technology that he observes in the second period, as well as the information conveyed 
to him by the firm’s decision to pay or not pay in the previous period, and the bribe price of b1 
that was offered in period one.  The payoffs for the regulator and firm in the second period are 
then b2-C and π 2–b2 respectively if the firm accepts the offer, and –C and 0 if the firm rejects the 
regulator’s offer.     
Thus, in each period high profit firms accept the regulator’s offer, while low profit firms 
reject it, and the regulator’s second period belief reflects this first-period action.  In this model, I 
solve for optimal b1
* and b2
*, (i.e. bribes in period one and two), as well as the optimal action of 
the regulator in deciding to revisit the firm in the second period.  I show that the optimal prices 
charged depend on the regulator’s beliefs about the profit distribution and the optimal action of 
the firms.  Furthermore, the action of the regulator in returning to collect more bribes depends on 
1) the observed characteristics of the firm in the first period, (i.e. π H), 2) the bribe amount that 
was collected in the first period (i.e. b1
*), and 3) the costs of returning to collect the bribe from 
firm i, (i.e. Ci).   
In the game, a strategy for the regulator is a first period offer b1, the decision whether to 
visit the firm again, depending on the costs of the visit and what was collected first period 
Ar(V2|b1,C), and a second-period offer of b2(b1) that specifies the offer b2, to be made depending 
on whether the first offer was accepted or rejected and the beliefs about the profit distribution in 
the second period.  
There is one second-period information set for each different first-period bribe offer the 
regulator might make, and his beliefs form a probability distribution over these information sets.  
In the full game, I denote the regulator’s first-period belief about the firm’s profit by µ 1(π 1 ), and 
the regulator’s second period belief as µ 2(π 2 |b1).  For the remainder of the model, however, I will 
denote beliefs for the regulator more simply as µ 1(π 1) and µ 2(π 2 | b1).  Additionally we make the 
simplifying assumption that first and second period profits do not change, and are known with 
certainty by the entrepreneur.   
A strategy for the firm involves two decisions.  Let A1(b1|π 1 ) equal one if the firm would 
accept the first-period offer b1 when its profit is π 1 , and zero if the firm would reject b1 when its   10 
profit is π 1 .  Likewise, let A2(b2|π 2 ) equal one if the firm would accept the second-period offer b2 
when its profit is π 2  and zero if the firm would reject b2 under these circumstances.  A strategy 
for the firm is a pair of functions [A1(b1|π 1 ), A2(b2|π 2 )].  Since the firm has complete information 
throughout the game, the beliefs of the firm are trivial.  Table 5 below summarizes the strategies 
and beliefs for both players over both periods of the game.   
Table 5:  Strategies and Beliefs for Entrepreneurs and Regulators 
 Strategies  Beliefs 
Period One  b1  µ 1(π 1 )  Regulator 
Period Two  b2 (b1), Ar(V2|b1,C)  µ 2(π 2 | b1) 
Period One  A1(b1|π 1 )    Firm 
Period Two  A2(b2|π 2 ) 
Trivial, full information 
 
 
We now more succinctly outline steps for solving the game between the regulator and the 
entrepreneur.  The simplest step to solving the game is to solve out for the last move, A2(b2|π 2 ).  
Since this is the last move, the optimal decision for the firm is to accept b2 (i.e. the bribe offer in 
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π        ( 3 )  
The next step is to identify the optimal bribe in the second period, b2, given the firm’s 
optimal action (shown above) and the regulator’s beliefs about π 2.  Given the firm’s strategy, it is 
also straightforward to show that b2 should be set to maximize the expected payoff, given the 
regulator’s belief µ 2(π 2 |b1) and the firm’s subsequent strategy A2(b2|π 2 ).  
The regulator’s beliefs in the second period, µ 2(π 2 |b1), depend on the actions of the firm 
in the first period.  If the firm rejects the first period offer, the regulator updates his beliefs about 
where the firm lies on the distribution of profits in the second period.  By rejecting the bribe 
offer in the first period, the entrepreneur signals to the regulator that the endpoint of the profit 
distribution on which she lies (i.e.  π H) can be no higher than the first period bribe offer.     
Conversely, if the first period offer was accepted, the updated belief about second period profits 
is that the lower bound of the profit distribution can be no less than the first period bribe offer, 
otherwise the firm would have rejected the offer.     11 
  
In the first period, however, firms also take into account how the accepting or rejecting of 
a first period bribe might affect the bribe price they will be offered in the following period 
because of the signal their action sends to the regulator.  Another factor influencing a firm’s 
decision is the cost to the regulator of visiting in the second period, since the entrepreneur knows 
that the regulator will only return for a second visit if Ci<b2(b1), i.e. if the costs of doing so are 
less than the bribe amount set in period two.  In short, firms have different strategies based on 
their knowledge of the costs to the regulator of returning for a visit, as well as their knowledge of 
the regulator’s strategy Ar(V2|b2(b1)) for returning to collect a bribe.  The regulator’s strategy to 





otherwise   0
C   ) (b b   if   1   1 2          ( 4 )  
There are essentially three different strategies for a firm, based on the regulator’s costs 
for visiting in period two.  I refer to the firm as a high cost visit firm if firm characteristics are 
such that the regulator’s cost of returning are higher than any possible bribe collected in period 
two, i.e. if C>b2(b1|a1).  In this case, given the regulator’s strategy, he will never return to collect 
a bribe in period two.  I refer to the firm as a low cost visit firm if firm characteristics are such 
that the regulator’s cost of returning are always lower than the possible bribe collected in period 
two, i.e. if C<(b2(b1|r1).  In this case, the regulator always returns to collect a bribe in period two, 
whether or not the first period bribe was rejected.  Finally, I refer to the firm as a medium cost 
visit firm if firm characteristics are such that costs are less than the second period bribe if the first 
period bribe was accepted, but greater than the second period bribe if first period was rejected, 
i.e. b2(b1|a1)>C>(b2(b1|r1).  In this case, the regulator will return in the second period if the first 
period bribe was accepted, but will not return in the second period if the first period bribe was 
rejected.   
Thus, the firm’s forward-looking strategy depends on whether or not the regulator will be 
back in the second period, and the relative payoffs of paying versus not paying the bribe. The 
payoffs of not paying the bribe now include the discounted value of a reduction in the price 
   12 
charged next period.  For each of the three types of firms described above, we solve for the 
equilibrium bribe in period one, the indifference level of profit in period one, and the second 
period bribes for both the case of rejection and acceptance of first period offers. 
For high cost firms, the regulator simply sets the first period bribe according to the 
following maximization problem; 
 
} b   rejects   Pr{firm 0     } b   accepts   firm Pr{ b Max 1 1 1 b1






π − H         ( 6 )  




, and in period 
two, b2
*=0 since the regulator never returns in the second period.  The indifference profit (i.e. the 
profit level at which the firm is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the profit) is 
π 1
*(b1)=b1. 
  For the case of low cost visit firm, the situation becomes slightly complex.  Low cost 
firms balance the payoffs this period of paying the bribe versus the discounted payoffs this 
period of not paying the bribe, knowing that the regulator will inevitably be back in the second 
period with a second-period offer.  These relative payoffs are reflected in the equations below. 
 
))] a | b ( b ( )) r | b ( b [(   b 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 − − − ≥ − π π δ π      (7) 
)) a | b ( b ( )) r | b ( b [( b   1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 − − − + ≥ π π δ π
     (8) 
() ) r | b ( b ) a | b ( b b ) b , (b 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 − + =
∗ δ π       ( 9 )  
  
Note that the left-hand side of equation 12 reflects the payoffs from paying the bribe in 
period one, while the right-hand side reflects the discounted payoff value of not paying the bribe 
in the first period.  Also note that π 1
*(b1,b2) represents the indifference profit, or the level of 
profit at which point the entrepreneur is just indifferent between paying and not paying the bribe   13 
in period one.  Thus, for arbitrary values of b1 and b2, firms with  ) b , b ( 2 1 1
∗ > π π will accept b1 and 
firms with  ) b , b ( 2 1 1
∗ < π π will reject b1, where b2(b1|a1) is the second period offer if first period 
was accepted and b2(b1|r1) is the second period offer if b1 was rejected.  Whether or not the firm 
accepts the first period offer thus conveys information to the regulator about where the firm lies 
on the profit distribution.  This information is then incorporated into the regulator’s second 
period offer. 
We can now derive µ 2(π |b1,r1) if the first period offer is rejected and µ 2(π |b1,a1) if the first 
period offer was accepted.  Given the first part of the firms’ strategy, A1(b1|π ) just derived, if the 
entrepreneur rejects the first period offer, then the regulator believes that the types remaining in 
the second period must be uniformly distributed on [0,π 1] where π 1=π 1
*(b1,b2).  Given this belief, 




.   
In the case where the entrepreneur accepts the first period offer, and given the firm’s 
strategy A1(b1|π ), the regulator now believes that the types remaining in the second period are 
uniformly distributed on [π 1,π H] where π 1=π 1
*(b1,b2).  Given this belief, the regulator’s optimal 
second period offer is 
2
3 1 π
, as derived in the myopic problem.  This implies that: 
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2
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The optimal bribe problem for the regulator is now reduced to the following one-period 
maximization problem: 
   14 
} b   accepts but    b   rejected   Pr{firm ) r | b ( b
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The solution to the maximization problem for the low cost firm is: 
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where b2
*(b1|r1) is the second period offer if first period offer is rejected, while b2
*(b1|a1) is the 
second period offer if the first period offer is accepted.   
For medium cost firms, in the case where  ) r | b ( b C ) a | b ( b 1 1 2 1 1 2 > > , and given that the 
regulator’s strategy is to visit firms in the second period only when C>b2, the solution algorithm 
is similar to the low cost visit firm’s similar to the low cost visit firm’s.  Again, finding the 
optimal bribes for the medium cost firms reduces down to a single period maximization problem, 
similar to the one shown above. A summary of equilibrium bribes and indifference profits for the 
three types of firms is shown in Table 6 below.     15 
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Section 3:  Simulation Exercises   
It is obvious from Table 6 that there are multiple equilibrium generated by this model. 
The optimal bribe values derived above show that the equilibrium bribe and the number of times 
that an entrepreneur will be charged differs among firms.  The manner in which the price and 
number of bribes a firm is offered depends on 1) the entrepreneur’s discount rate, 2) the cost to 
the regulator of visiting the firm, and 3) the profit distribution perceived by the regulator.  
We examine how optimal bribes and indifference profits vary according to changes in an 
entrepreneur’s discount rate, using simulations (see Figure 1 below). Note that an entrepreneur’s 
discount rate is inversely related to the size of the bribe that she will be charged.  This result is 
intuitive: the more that the entrepreneur cares about the future, the more she will have to be 
compensated, in the form of a smaller bribe, for her losses next period due to her payment this 
period.    
One interpretation of the discount rate, δ , is to think of it as the periodicity of regulatory 
visits.    In this sense, the more periodical a scheduled visit is for the regulator, the less of a bribe 
he will be able to command.  The periodicity of a regulatory visit is idiosyncratic to the firm, and 
is generally determined by the type of regulator conducting inspections.  Thus, while there is 
always a second period in the game, the timing of the second period will vary across firms under 
this interpretation.       16 
  
It is important to know 1) the magnitude of the change associated with a variation in the discount 
rate, 2) how different firm types are affected differently according to changes in the discount 
rate, and 3) a difference in the net amount of bribes paid according to firm type with a given 
discount rate.   These are important issues because they invoke a sense of relative  “winners” and 
“losers” by firms of different types, which is of interest from a societal welfare perspective.   








These simulation results suggest that as regulatory inspections occur with greater 
frequency across all firms, the relative differences in bribe offers diverge substantially between 
low and medium cost visit firms, ceteris paribus.   
  Another important aspect of this exercise is to identify total of bribe.  Total bribes for 
both periods are shown in Figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2: Total Bribe Amounts for High, Medium, and Low Cost Firms 
  The most important point of this graph, is to note that total bribe offers will vary 
substantially across different types of firms, firms with different discount rates, and according to 
first period actions, even assuming that enterprises have identical perceived profit distributions.  
The implication of these results point to the quasi-arbitrary nature of regulatory rent-seeking; 
even firms with identical production characteristics will be offered different bribes within and 
across time periods.       
  Another aspect of the optimal and differential bribes offered across firm types is how 
changes in the distribution of perceived profits (i.e. differences in observable production 
technologies and inputs) changes the optimal bribe price offered by the regulator.  One issue to 
examine is how changes in the perceived profit distribution affects bribe offers to firms of 
different types.    
It is straightforward to calculate the derivative of bribe offers and indifference profits 
across firm types. However, one can easily observe from Table 6 above, that for all non-zero 
derivatives shown above, the signs are consistently positive.  The intuition behind this is simple, 
but profound; the more that a regulator perceives to be a firm’s ability to pay, the higher the 
bribe price that he will charge.  Does the magnitude differ among the changes in bribe price 
according to cost structure?  Figure 3 shows how changes in the bribe offered in first period 
differ among firm types as perceived profit distributions change.    18 
 
Figure 3:  First Period Bribes with Changes in the Perceived Profit Distribution of the 
Regulator for High, Medium, and Low Cost Firms  
   
What is of importance to consider when examining the how bribe offers change with 
respect to the profit distribution is to remember that the underlying assumption driving the 
regulator’s beliefs about π H, the maximum profit level, is a firm’s observable production inputs, 
which are the only discernible indications of firm profitability. 
The upshot is that if one accepts that bribes change according to changes in observable 
factor inputs, than one can conceive that these payments act as a tax on productive.  The social 
costs of such a phenomenon may be high if entrepreneurs change productive choices on the basis 
of factor prices inclusive of the bribe tax, leading to sub-optimal social rates of return on 
productive assets.    This point is in direct contrast to those that argue that graft represents a pure 
transfer with no effect on economic allocation (Bliss and DiTella, 1997).   
While it is of interest to know how the bribe offers and quantities differ across firm types 
and with respect to changes in discount rates, cost structures, and profit distributions, these 
calculations tell us little about the relative costs imposed on firms of varying types.  The actual 
welfare effects of different bribe prices and quantities depend on the true profit of the firm and 
the beliefs of the regulator, characterized by the moments of the profit distribution .  
To understand how differential prices and quantities affect firms’ actual payments, one is 
less interested in the prices and quantities charged, than in the prices and quantities paid, the 
payments in proportion to before-bribe profits, and the total losses incurred for both payments 
and non payments of bribes.   In short, here we take into account the penalties that are paid when   19 
the regulator’s bribe offer is too high for the firm to pay.  Only by incorporating the penalties as 
well as the bribes paid can one determine the relative losses across firms of different types.  
Table 7 below provides the loss equations for firms of varying types. 
 
Table 7:  Loss Equations Associated with Bribe Offers and Ability to Pay 
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Recall that the penalty structure of the game is such that either a firm pays a bribe to the 
regulator, or incurs a penalty.  These equations above represent the losses associated with either 
the bribe payment or the penalty for non-payment in each period. Figure 4 below illustrates total 
losses incurred by the firm as a proportion of the true profit of the firm.    
 
Figure 4 Total Losses from Bribes and Penalties as a Proportion of True Profit 
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  It is arguable that Figure 4 perhaps best illustrates the welfare consequences associated 
with differential bribe prices and quantities coupled with incomplete information regarding firm 
profit on the part of the corrupt regulator. The lower the true profit is relative to what the 
regulator perceives it to be, the higher the proportion of profits that are lost in a directly 
unproductive manner.  In this sense, the best-performing firms pay the smallest relative amount 
in bribe taxes, while those firms on the margin pay strikingly more.  This finding is consistent 
with the work of Tanzi (1998), Gupta et al. (1997), and others who maintain that not only is the 
problem of corruption regressive with respect to firm size, it is also regressive with respect to 
income levels, most affecting those with the least resources.   
 
Section 4:  Conclusion  
Since 1993 the number of government workers in Russia has swelled from 800,000 to 
more than a million, becoming a major impediment to economic reform.  Even Vladimir Putin, 
in his 2001 State of the Union address pointed out that, 
“The system is defending its right to so-called status quo rent.  To put it in a more direct 
way, the right to bribes and kickbacks,” and that “We must have no illusions; only 
transparent relations between the state and entrepreneurs can give a new impulse to the 
development of the Russian Economy (New York Times, April 4, 2001).” 
 
  The objective of this paper was to investigate the manner in which regulatory-induced 
corruption affects micro and small enterprises in Russia.  Empirical evidence suggests that micro 
and small businesses vary substantially in reporting how problematic corruption is for their 
enterprise.  A theoretical model explores why extortion from regulators may occur in a non-
uniform manner across firms.  The theoretical model postulates that government regulators 
customize the nature of their rent-seeking activities towards firms (i.e. the number of times they 
demand a bribe, as well as the price they will charge each firm), similar to a price-discriminating 
monopolist facing hidden information. Supportive empirical evidence comes from survey data 
collected on Russian microenterprises. 
  The model shows that production technologies, input choices, and exogenous firm 
characteristics, such as location, play a role in determining the bribe price that a regulator will 
charge a firm, as well as the number of times he will return to collect it.  We also examine the 
welfare effects associated with differential bribe payments across firms.  Simulations of the   21 
theoretical model demonstrate that the presence of corruption most strongly impacts firms that 
are least profitable.   In this sense, we show that differential corruption is extremely regressive, 
harming enterprises disproportionate in their ability to pay a bribe.   
The policy implications of this study are profound.   Involuntary bribe payments fall into 
the realm of directly unproductive activities (DUPs) (Bhagwati, 1982), and cause a deadweight 
loss to society.  As scarce resources are diverted from entrepreneurial investments and 
innovation, to regulatory payments that are not converted into the provision of public goods, or 
to innovation in regulatory avoidance activities, the loss to society is immeasurable.   This loss 
may be particularly acute in Russia, where post-transition poverty and unemployment have led to 
a significant deterioration in standards of living, and are reflected in current statistics on public 
health, crime, life expectancy, unemployment, and education.     
  The effect of corruption on microenterprises can be deleterious on both a sectoral and an 
individual firm level.  Policies that inhibit the development of a microenterprise sector have 
implications for poverty.  The microenterprise sector is particularly important in Russia because 
extended households and other social insurance mechanisms to deal with unanticipated income 
shocks, such as sudden unemployment, are not prevalent.  In the absence of traditional state-
sponsored employment or other social safety nets that have gradually disappeared over the past 
decade, the income generating opportunities provided by micro and small enterprises play an 
important role in poverty alleviation and household risk reduction.  However, the microenterprise 
sector is relatively small and underdeveloped, due in part to the adverse policy environment 
surrounding it.   
  Corruption may also cause a loss of efficiency for individual firms because it may force 
firms to incur a number of unproductive costs, thereby leading to a welfare-reducing allocation 
of resources.  When regulators base their bribe price on what they can observe during a firm 
inspection, bribe payments act as a tax on certain factors of production.  In this sense, corruption 
changes relative factor prices and may lead to sub-optimal input use.  Furthermore, firms may be 
less inclined to invest in cost-saving or production enhancing technologies because of the 
additional regulatory scrutiny that such actions may attract. 
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